T he discourse of Confucian capitalism in East Asia is built upon two assumptions. First, some Confucian virtues, such as strong family ties, the greater importance of community over individuals and social cohesiveness, have remained intact in East Asia. Second, these virtues have contributed to the industrialization of East Asian countries. For example, the collective orientation for catch-up growth helped the state to set development as the nation's priority goal and to mobilize society to achieve this goal. 1 For the scholars of Confucian capitalism, South Korea (hereafter, Korea) is a typical case of this discourse. They have highlighted a well-preserved tradition of elderly support by young breadwinners despite the country's rapid industrialization.
2 Within Korean households, adult children play the bread-winning role and take care of their dependent family members. Retired parents, lacking reliable income after leaving the workforce, depend on their adult children for support. The scholars have further argued that this type of intergenerational linkage has shaped strong collective bonds among Koreans, which has empowered the state to endeavour to achieve economic growth in the name of the public good of the nation. most jobs have come from the small-and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The effects of crony capitalism on labour markets are straightforward. Young people face diffi culty in fi nding "desirable" jobs in LEs, while refusing to apply for SME jobs of poor quality. Lacking suffi cient support from their children, many elderly people make up the gap in the labour shortage of SMEs. Consequently, Korea's crony capitalism has distorted the labourdemand structure to exclude young workers from desirable jobs while driving old workers into poor-quality jobs.
The second problem is growth absolutism, which has long overshadowed social concerns for effective labour-supply policies. The lack of social security has driven elderly Koreans to take marginal jobs. Ineffective regulation of small businesses has made those fi rms not only unprofi table but also to their fl ooding the market. The pervasiveness of unprofi table small businesses has discouraged the young from seeking work. As a result, growth absolutism has inhibited the possible progress of young and old workers toward the more productive and secure market status. In sum, two characteristics of Korea's industrialization-crony capitalism and growth absolutism-affect the behaviour of young and old workers and thus prevent them from realizing the Confucian virtue of support of the elderly.
A more detailed description of the demographic imbalance in Korean labour markets follows this introduction. The study then offers substantive analysis. It critiques the exogenous explanations about Korea's problem of overworked elderly and underworked youth. Next, it investigates how Korea's unique course of industrialization has affected the structures of labour supply and demand, thus resulting in the demographic imbalance. The fi nal section presents a critique of Confucian capitalism in East Asia and emphasizes the importance of political considerations and institutional design to making economic development and Confucian tradition more compatible.
Overworked elderly and underworked youth in Korea
As noted, Korea has an unusually large elderly workforce and a disproportionately small young workforce. Many older Koreans continue to work and forego their traditional role as retired dependents. Over the past two decades, 25 to 30 percent of the Korean elderly aged 65 years or older have participated in labour markets. 5 The high percentage of the working elderly is signifi cant in three ways. First, Korea's working elderly population is larger than that of most other countries. In 2000, for example, 29.9 percent of Koreans aged 65 years or older belonged to the economically active population (EAP), which refers to individuals who are currently employed or actively seeking employment. The Korean percentage was the highest among all countries with a per capita GNI (gross national income) that is 
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more than the upper-middle-income level (US$12,072). Second, the high percentage indicates that many elderly Koreans not only stay in, but also return to, labour markets. Most Korean fi rms set the retirement age at the mid-to late fi fties. Finally, the EAP rate of elderly Koreans has steadily increased. Korea's rate was lower than that of Japan or Malaysia in the early 1980s, but Korea has surpassed these countries since then.
Conversely, many young Koreans have not participated in labour markets. Only 70.5 percent of Koreans in the age range of 25 to 29 years were economically active in 2000. 6 This rate was lower than that of most countries above the upper-middle-income level. The rate increased to 73.7 percent in 2005, but still ranked second lowest, just above Chile (71.6 percent). The low labour market participation of young Koreans is remarkable for three reasons. First, it shows that rapid industrialization has not incorporated young Koreans into labour markets swiftly. Among the countries that have annually developed more than 5 percent during the past two decades, including Singapore, Ireland, Malaysia, Chile and Poland, only the EAP rate of young Koreans has not exceeded 80 percent. Second, the compulsory conscription system might account for the low EAP rate of young Koreans. However, Korea has a lower EAP rate than Chile, Singapore and Taiwan, which have similar conscription systems. Third, one may claim that the low EAP rate of young Korean workers is simply due to low labour market participation of young females (63.9 percent in 2005). However, the EAP rate of Korean youth aged 25 to 29 is even lower than that of Chile, the Czech Republic, Italy, Malaysia and Taiwan, countries with EAP rates for female youth that are similar to, or even lower than, that of Korea (60 to 65 percent). Figure 1 shows to what extent the demographic composition of Korean labour markets is unbalanced compared with those of other countries. It plots the countries over the upper-middle-income level on the EAP indexes of elderly (aged 65 or more) and youth (aged 25-29) in 2001. Varying EAP rates are scaled down between 1 and 0 by setting the maximum and minimum rate to 1 and 0, respectively (for the elderly, 30 percent = 1 and 0 percent = 0; for the youth, 100 percent = 1 and 70 percent = 0).
Consequently, figure 1 reveals a highly unbalanced demographic composition of Korean labour markets in a comparative perspective. It shows an overall tendency across all selected countries for a higher EAP rate for the elderly and a lower EAP rate for the youth. Korea tends toward this pattern in the extreme: The country reveals a combination of the highest EAP rate for the elderly and the lowest EAP rate for the youth among all The 25-to-29 age group best explains how young Koreans enter labour markets after leaving school. In comparison, many of the 20-to-24 group are still in school, not ready to work (the EAP rate = 56.9 percent in 2000). Some male Koreans begin to work in their thirties after completing their military duty. However, the EAP rate of the 30-to-34 age group is only slightly higher than that of the 25-to-29 age group (72.6 versus 70.5 percent in 2000).
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selected countries. Figure 1 also compares Korea with other East Asian countries. Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong are cases in which the Confucian model of support of the elderly by bread-winning youth is preserved in their respective labour markets. These countries have larger youth workforces and smaller elderly workforces than most Western countries cited in the fi gure. By contrast, Korea, Japan and Malaysia fail to conform to the Confucian model with their higher elderly EAP rates and lower youth EAP rates. Among the three, Korea's demographic imbalance is the most extreme. This is about more than demographic composition. It indicates that the traditional virtue of elderly support is decoupled in Korean society and the relationship between young and old Koreans as caregivers and caretakers is damaged. The absence of approximately 30 percent of youth from labour markets has prevented the formation of household assets and weakened families' ability to support the elderly. According to table 1, the practice of family-based support of the elderly is functioning yet insuffi cient to support older Koreans. Family members contributed 44.7 percent of the incomes of the Korean elderly aged 60 years or older, but the elderly still needed to earn 30 percent themselves. When it comes to the subgroup aged 65 to 69, the situation is harsher. Family members were responsible for only 29.7 percent of the incomes of these elderly, while the elderly themselves had to earn 44.6 percent themselves.
The weakened tradition of family-based support for the elderly has been related to the poor working conditions of young Koreans. Several disadvantages prevent them from accumulating assets and being prepared to play the bread-winning role. Above all, young Koreans need a long period of time to find jobs after graduation. In 2003, for example, over 35 percent of young Koreans aged 20 to 30 found their first job six months after graduation, while over 10 percent did not participate in labour markets even three years after leaving school. 7 The other obstacles are related to labour market duality in Korea, not only between regular and non-regular jobs but also between LEs and SMEs. 8 As figure 2 shows, a substantial proportion of younger workers aged 25 to 29 years entered labour markets as temporary workers, hired on a definite contract for at least a month but less than a year. Furthermore, the unemployment rate for younger workers is higher than for other age groups. Even before the financial crisis of 1997-1998, when 
the overall unemployment rate stabilized at 2 to 2.5 percent, the unemployment rate for the group aged 20 to 29 years was higher than 7 percent. Since 1998, this rate has fl uctuated between 7 percent and 14 percent. 9 Next, wages put young workers at a disadvantage. In 2007, for example, hourly pay for workers aged 20 to 29 years was only 65 percent of those for workers aged 30 to 39 years. If these young workers were in non-regular positions, they received only 50 percent of what workers in their thirties were receiving. 10 Finally, it has become diffi cult for young Koreans to get "desirable" jobs in LEs that guarantee the security of a salaried position. LEs are hiring fewer younger workers. In the late 1990s, LEs, such as public fi rms and fi nancial institutions, recruited 40 percent of their employees from mid-career workers. By 2004, however, mid-career workers made up 80 percent of the LEs' new hiring. 
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Facing the weakened practice of family-based support of the elderly, many older Koreans have no other choice than working. However, this is not a good answer under the conditions of labour market duality. The opportunities for regular jobs are limited for older Korean workers. As fi gure 2 illustrates, older Koreans are more likely to become daily workers, whose employment period is shorter than a month, than to obtain regular salaried positions. Often, they start their own businesses. For example, in 2004, 13.2 percent of workers aged 60 and over were daily workers and 46.8 percent were ownaccount workers, while 9.7 percent and 19.6 percent of the overall population fell in these two categories. Unpaid family employment is also more frequent among the elderly than other age groups. Meanwhile, older workers are paid less than others. Regular salaried workers aged 60 and older were paid 20 percent less than workers in their thirties. The salaries for older non-regular workers remain less than 50 percent of those for workers in their thirties. 12 Finally, jobs for older Koreans are mainly available in unproductive small businesses and underpaid manual work. More than 45 percent of elderly workers, according to fi gure 2, are self-employed (mostly, own-account workers) in low-skilled service sectors, such as retail shops (25.5 percent), restaurants (66.5 percent), lodging (2.4 percent), freighting services (5.3 percent), taxi driving (2.2 percent), and laundries (1.0 percent). 13 Most of the salaried positions for the elderly are the so-called three-D jobs-dirty, dangerous and diffi cult-which include manual workers in manufacturing and construction fi rms (20.0 percent), building janitors (14.4 percent), street cleaners (12.8 percent), and kitchen assistants (3.5 percent).
14

The conventional explanations: The external determinants of an internal problem
Conventionally, the problem of demographic imbalance has been attributed to external factors unrelated to Korea's industrialization. Labour economists contend that the rapid decline in mortality in Korean society has created a grey labour market, and this has resulted in an unusually large elderly workforce. 15 Korea has recently witnessed a stunning increase in the pace of aging due to the dramatic decline in the mortality rate. In 1999, approximately 7 percent of its population was 65 and older. In 2018, this age 
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group will comprise over 15 percent of the population. 16 Therefore, there has been a demographic shift; the aging of the population has made the greying of the labour force inevitable. The median age of the overall working population has increased from the mid-thirties in the 1990s to the mid-forties in the late 2000s. The EAP rates of workers in their fi fties and sixties have rapidly increased, and are expected to be similar to those of workers in their forties in 2025. 17 Labour economists state that low labour market participation of younger Koreans is caused by external factors of labour markets. They argue that the rigidity of the employment protection regulation inhibits employers from replacing current jobholders with younger employees. Some critics blame labour unions for strict employment protection and thus for the youth unemployment problem. 18 They also insist that the current education system is not providing students with the skills they need for the contemporary workplace. Education was once regarded as a key factor behind the country's economic development. As fi rms have recently felt growing pressure to meet rapidly changing technological demands, however, concerns have emerged about a serious skills mismatch between the general knowledge the youth obtain in universities and the job-specifi c skills employers demand.
19 Overeducation is a similar problem. As a result of extended education, it has become diffi cult for an increasing number of well-educated youth to fi nd jobs commensurate with their qualifi cations.
20
There is no doubt that the aging of a country's population will manifest itself in labour markets. Also, some external factors may pose diffi culties for job candidates to fi nd desirable positions. However, these explanations are signifi cantly limited. The fi rst limitation is that the explanations are too general to apply to Korea's specifi c conditions. Korea's rapid aging rate cannot explain why Korea's working elderly population significantly outnumbers that of other countries with similarly aging populations. Moreover, the number of working elderly in Korea was large even in the 1980s, when the rate of aging was less pronounced. This indicates that the aging rate per se is a less critical factor in determining the labour market participation of the elderly than fi nancial conditions, such as pensions, savings and housing. Meanwhile, it is hard to argue that Korea's labour unions 
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have kept young people from fi nding new jobs. While Korea has only a 10 percent unionization rate, its younger workforce is smaller than in European countries (e.g., Sweden, Germany, and Denmark), the unionization rates of which are over 50 percent.
Moreover, labour economists have not developed a unifi ed explanation to account for the problem of demographic imbalance. They separate the phenomenon of overworked elderly from that of underworked youth while enumerating multiple factors to explain each phenomenon. Indeed, the problem of demographic imbalance has multiple aspects and causes. However, the lack of a unifi ed explanation means that labour economists see the demographic imbalance not as a critical problem inherent in Korean labour markets but only as a collection of minor problems associated with various external factors.
Cultural theorists, on the other hand, provide a more relevant approach. They focus on the diminishing infl uence of Confucian values to explain the demographic problem in Korean labour markets. 21 They have reported the increasing tendency among Koreans to escape from their traditional responsibility as caretakers of the elderly. 22 Under these circumstances, an increasing number of adult children have lost the incentive to play the breadwinning role. Their elderly parents fi nd it necessary to stay in labour markets to take care of themselves.
The diminishing infl uence of Confucian values may systematically explain the problem of demographic imbalance in Korean labour markets. However, the argument that Confucianism has lost its infl uence in Korea is at best controversial. 23 The real question is that although the Confucian virtue of support for the elderly has been adopted by the Korean family, it is not clear why this virtue has not been integrated in the Korean labour markets.
The main problem with the approaches of both labour economists and cultural theorists is that neither addresses the internal contradictions of Korean labour markets or industrial arrangements. Neither the aging population nor the evolving Confucian values explain why older workers would take A survey shows that only 47 percent of Korean citizens answered "yes" to the question: "Do you think that children should help their parents when the parents get old or they should take care of themselves?" This rate is much lower than that of Chinese citizens (70.5 percent in Beijing, 79.9 percent in Hong Kong and 71.3 percent in Taiwan) and slightly higher than that of Japanese citizens (44.5 
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Likewise, the quality of education merely accounts for a relatively long jobsearching period for university graduates without explaining the overall low participation of young Koreans in labour markets. The cultural interpretation does not explain why such problems as involuntary unemployment, abandoned job searches and labour market departure have frequently occurred among most young Koreans regardless of their education levels. This implies that the problem is a critical limitation of the Korean labour market institution in absorbing the youth workforce. In addition, this problem cannot be simply the result of the diminished infl uence of Confucian morality.
It is interesting that both labour economists and cultural theorists have shaped political debates over the demographic issues in Korea. Accepting the cultural perspective, the conservative camp, including the Grand National Party and the newspaper Chosônilbo, argue that the solution to the problems of overworked elderly and underworked youth must be the restoration of traditional family structure. 24 Labour economists infl uence the progressive camp, including the Democratic Party, the Democratic Labour Party and the newspaper Han'gyôresinmun. This camp proposes that the state take a more active role in assisting the elderly economically and in helping youth fi nd adequate employment. 25 However, both progressives and conservatives share the same assumption, that the problems of working elderly and underemployed youth are a new phenomenon resulting from external conditions. None has considered how these problems have historically emerged or, more exactly, how Korea's course of industrialization has been associated with the problem of demographic imbalance.
The political origin of demographic imbalance
The remainder of this study emphasizes the historical responsibility of political choice for the problem of demographic imbalance in Korean labour markets. It proposes that an unusually large elderly workforce and a small young workforce in Korea have arisen from the unique manner in which this country pursued industrialization and the resulting contradictions in its labour markets. Two characteristics of Korea's development path corroborate this hypothesis: crony capitalism and growth absolutism. 
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Crony capitalism and distorted labour demand
Crony capitalism is a dominant characteristic of the Korean economy as a result of the close, biased relationship of the state with the chaebol. 26 The state has given favours and special privileges, such as tax breaks, fi nancial assistance and the reduction of entry barriers, to the selected chaebol to expedite industrialization over the past decades. As a result, the impressive export performance of the chaebol fuelled Korea's economic growth. The contribution of exports to economic growth amounted to 93.3 percent in 2004, while the chaebol accounted for 65.2 percent of the nation's total export volume that year. 27 The state also provided special favours for the chaebol and helped them diversify into multiple industries domestically. Using stock acquisition, mergers, co-management and the new corporate establishment, the chaebol have diversifi ed their business into more than 70 percent of industrial sectors. 28 In the early 2000s, the 50 largest fi rms produced over 30 percent of products and services across all industries. The share of the fi ve largest fi rms of the nation's property and sales volume reached nearly 50 percent and 40 percent, respectively.
29
However, crony capitalism has substantially distorted the demand structure of Korean labour markets. This characteristic of Korea's economic development has limited the industrial capacity for job creation and resulted in the imbalance between LEs and SMEs in both quality and quantity of employment. First, this strategy has limited the overall capacity of the Korean economy to absorb workers. The chaebol's strategy of taking over the existing market share in advanced countries has resulted in the "fallacy of composition"; as multiple countries have competed over a limited range of export markets with similar products, the gains from exports have decreased and the employment growth has stagnated. 30 In addition, the evolving structure of the export industry has worsened the industrial capacity for job creation. Although the chaebol have been able to gain a new competitive edge in the world market by shifting to the information technology (IT) industry, IT development has had a unique, negative effect on the domestic capacity for job creation. A small number of chaebol has monopolized the major export items, including mobile phones, display panels and semiconductors, but they have been dependent on foreign countries for licenses, raw technologies and parts. In contrast to the burgeoning manufacturing sectors that were more associated with domestic resources and technology in the past, Korea's growing exports in the IT industry have not translated into domestic industrial growth and job creation.
Second, Korea's crony capitalism has resulted in a severe gap between LEs and SMEs in market performance. Through the strategy of diversifi cation, the chaebol have taken over SMEs' domestic market shares. The dominant market power of the chaebol has prevented SMEs from developing into competitive enterprises. Facing LEs' continuing infi ltration into diverse sectors, the majority of Korean SMEs have become survival-oriented fi rms, which are not profi table and do not make investments for the future. The labour-intensive SMEs have gradually lost competitiveness in domestic and world markets due to their increasingly outdated technologies. When domestic fi rms were forced to restructure to survive fi erce global competition, most of the losers were SMEs because they lacked fi nancial resources and were less productive than LEs (see table 2). Finally, a serious imbalance has emerged between LEs and SMEs in the quantity of jobs. LEs offer better-paid and more secure jobs than SMEs. As noted, however, there are limitations in LEs' export strategies to create new jobs. Table 3 shows the contribution of specifi c macroeconomic factors to job creation. In comparison with consumption and investment, job creation through exports has plummeted during the past decade. In 2000, exports increased by W ==1 billion, generating 6.47 new jobs in the manufacturing
31
The fi nancial crisis posed the greatest challenge to the Korean LEs because they were no longer considered "too big to die." However, many LEs survived the crisis by depending on public funds injected by the government. sectors, which was only a third of the 1990 level. Meanwhile, SMEs have continued to generate a number of low-skilled and low-paid jobs. To compete and overcome their technological handicaps, SMEs have expanded low-paid employment, particularly through outsourcing and temporary employment. This has led to an accelerated downward spiral of decreasing productivity and increasing low-paid jobs.
32 Although SMEs have already absorbed an excessive number of low-paid workers, they have still experienced serious labour shortages (see table 4). 
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The distorted structure of labour demand has excluded young workers from desirable jobs while driving old workers into poor-quality jobs. On the one hand, the reduction in the number of desirable jobs in LEs has prevented young Koreans from entering the workforce. A clear-cut gap between LEs and SMEs in job quality has also decreased the opportunities for young job seekers. As the labour demand structure has been increasingly bifurcated into jobs for the highly educated and jobs for the low-educated, it has become diffi cult for many "ordinary" young Koreans to manoeuvre themselves into appropriate positions. That is, the transition from school to workplace has been delayed, not because young Koreans are inadequately educated, as many labour economists argued, but because the structure of labour demand is too distorted to absorb those people.
On the other hand, constrained employment opportunities for many elderly Koreans have driven them to remain in the labour market. Given the limited opportunities for getting stable and well-paid jobs when they were young, many of the elderly were not able to provide for their old age. It is also hard for adult children to provide enough fi nancial support for their parents because they face the diffi culty of earning money to provide for their immediate families' needs. Under the circumstances, the single choice for old Koreans has been to re-enter labour markets, even after retirement.
If they decide to re-enter labour markets, the Korean elderly have only two options. One is to accept the low-paid, secondary jobs in SMEs, which young people avoid. The other is to open a small business. Lacking technological qualifi cations and fi nancial resources, many older Koreans have become selfemployed, providing small services and engaging in manufacturing in urban areas. This pattern is well documented by the fact that Korea has a large number of small businesses. Today, self-employment amounts to over 30 percent of total employment in Korea. Businesses with fi ve or fewer workers comprise more than 85 percent of total business organizations.
33
Growth absolutism and under-regulated labour supply
Effective labour supply policies, such as job creation and social welfare, could help many young and old workers overcome the distorted demand structure and seek more lucrative and secure job status. However, this has barely occurred due to policy makers' commitment to growth absolutism. "Growth absolutism" here refers to the preoccupation of the Korean state with the goal of economic growth and the sidelining of important labour-supply goals, such as job creation and social welfare. 34 Policy makers have not considered effective policies that would regulate the labour supply in a more productive and secure way. For example, social welfare programs and job creation policies have remained extremely underdeveloped. The excessive competition among small businesses has not been properly regulated. Under such conditions of underregulated labour supply, many old and young workers have been deprived of opportunities to develop their careers.
The Sôgang School was an ideological backbone of growth absolutism.
35
In the mid-1960s, this school replaced the heretofore dominant theory of balanced growth and placed economic growth above social welfare. It proposed a "trickle-down theory," arguing that income growth and economic development would produce jobs automatically, thereby resolving the social welfare and income distribution problems. The infl uence of the Sôgang School was widespread because its members took high-profi le positions in the economic ministries and the leading economic think tanks, like the Korea Development Institute (KDI). 36 Its mantra, "such'ul mani salgil ida" (Export is the only way to survive), strongly infl uenced the Park Chung-Hee (Pak Chông-hûi) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) and Chun Doo-Hwan (Chôn Tu-hwan) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) regimes. During these periods, Korean presidents pressured economy-related ministries, chaebol leaders, and bank chairmen to achieve their annual and monthly export goals. On the other hand, the Ministry of Labour (MOL) and the Ministry of Welfare and Society (MWS) had no independent capacity to design social policies. The responsibility of these small ministries was limited to managing labour disputes, constraining wage increases, and calculating welfare benefi ts.
Under the aegis of growth absolutism, policy makers recognized the workforces not as something to be activated or protected by the state but merely as a resource to be exploited by industry. Three cases substantiate this point. First, income maintenance programs developed late. Korea did not create a pension system until the late 1980s. Moreover, the new pension program only partially copied Japan's three-tiered public pension system. Japan's system comprises the public welfare pension (kösei nenkin) for salaried workers, the mutual aid pension (kyösai nenkin) for government offi cials and the national pension (kokumin nenkin) for all others. Although Korea borrowed Japan's term "national pension" in 1988, the Korean system covered only about 20 percent of workers, mostly in large fi rms. This means that many older Koreans could not depend on a publicly funded pension.
Second, the Korean government has only recently developed a job creation program. The employment insurance system was created in 1995. Korea's new system had two features. It focused on retraining current job holders The name comes from the fact most of its members that were the former faculty of the Sôgang University. 
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rather than on creating new jobs for marginal groups or new recruits. To avoid the problem of moral hazard-for instance, that the insured unemployed fail to compete for jobs-Korea's employment insurance includes particular work-inducing incentives, such as strict qualifi cation criteria and sanctions on sluggish job searching. Therefore, those trying to enter labour markets have not benefi ted from the system. In particular, policies for encouraging youth and women to fi nd jobs are almost nonexistent in Korea.
Finally, the Korean government has not developed any fi nancial system for helping small businesses upgrade technology and enhance competitiveness. Until the early 1980s, for example, the share of bank credit allocated to small businesses had stagnated at 20 to 30 percent, although banks were the major fi nancial source for these fi rms. The SME Bank (Chungsogiôp ûnhaeng) was founded in the early 1960s. However, this institution was not helpful in supporting small businesses because it only secured loans for such businesses through high-priced collateral. Later, President Chun implemented more generous support for small businesses; while requiring banks to reserve a certain portion of credit for small businesses (for example, a start-up fund), the small business share of bank credit increased to 45 percent in the mid1980s. 37 However, the extended support under Chun's regime was not an effective system for the long-term performance of small business. The new fi nancial support was often used to delay the market exit of fi rms, which had no market competitiveness or technological qualifi cations.
Lack of effective regulation of small businesses was also refl ected in a poor administrative system. Until quite recently, the state lacked effective organizations to monitor and guide the numerous small enterprises. At the ministerial level, the main responsibilities were scattered among the Ministry of Industry and Resources (MIR), the Ministry of Construction and Transportation (MCT) and the Small and Medium Business Administration (SMBA). While the medium-sized enterprises could access the assistance and information provided by 500 public agencies and centres, the Small Business Development Centre (SBDC) was the single organization that could help small businesses. Such poor administrative systems indicate that small businesses remained excluded from the state's policy concerns.
The administrations of presidents Kim Dae-Jung (Kim Tae- 
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the unbalanced growth strategy was more visible, but now its drawbacks, i.e., deepening polarization, have emerged dramatically."
38 Instead, the two administrations endeavoured to incorporate many marginal groups into the welfare system. They extended the national pension program to cover the whole population, while developing active policies that helped marginal groups participate in labour markets. The Roh administration, in particular, developed more targeted policies for old and young workers. Youth employment measures included a) a youth work experience program that provides unemployed youth with internship opportunities in public institutions and subsidized private companies to offer internal opportunities, and b) a tailored vocational training and youth employment package project that trains young workers in knowledge-based technology and helps them fi nd jobs in such industrial sectors. Additionally, the Roh administration invented the "work integration scheme" in the social service sector. The administration anticipated that under the fi nancial support of the government, the new social enterprises would provide job opportunities as well as physical care to the elderly in need.
However, although welfare expenditure increased during these administrations, Korea's social expenditure still remains meagre, leaving many of the elderly and new recruits under-protected. This expenditure, as a percentage of GDP, is the second-lowest level (8.6 percent in 2005) of the members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Another limitation in Korea's welfare expansion is the government's low capacity to enforce new welfare programs in small fi rms and among the self-employed. Because the government has tolerated these fi rms' avoidance of welfare obligations, many young and old workers are still excluded from the income support programs. 39 Finally, growth absolutism has prevented the Korean society from realizing the tradition of support of the elderly through its labour markets. The underregulation of the labour supply has made it diffi cult for young Koreans to fi nd secure jobs and thereby support their elderly relatives in need. Active policies for job creation could have helped youth fi nd employment. However, the underdevelopment of this policy has delayed the transition of young people from school to the workplace. The programs for youth employment were only recently created, and approximately 70 percent of new graduates have been left without a chance to be educated for or informed of appropriate jobs. 
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Meanwhile, the pervasiveness of unprofi table small businesses is one of the key barriers to the labour market participation of young Koreans. Increasing job insecurity and poor market performance of those small businesses have discouraged young graduates from searching for jobs in small businesses, although these fi rms are suffering from labour shortages. In particular, this problem is associated with the low labour market participation of young Korean women. Without policy supports to help them start their careers in more lucrative industries, many young females have had to settle for jobs in relatively small fi rms after leaving school (see fi gure 3). However, they have found salaries, working conditions, and possibilities for career development quite unsatisfactory in most small businesses. They have thus opted to exit labour markets altogether and become housewives. This explains the large gap in the EAP rate of female Koreans between their late twenties and early thirties. 
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Finally, more generous income supports have taken the place of family support and thereby reduced the number of elderly workers who needed to re-enter labour markets. However, as shown in above table 1, public assistance has not constituted a major income source for the Korean elderly. Only 10 percent of the elderly have benefi ted from public pensions, including those provided by the national pension program. 42 When faced with the prospect of poverty, some older Koreans have accepted low-paying jobs in SMEs. In particular, the recent increase in the number of older female workers is because many of them have been absorbed into the secondary labour market, with correspondingly high turnover and low salary. 43 Others have opened small businesses or become unpaid workers in family-run small businesses. Without effective regulation of small businesses, many older Koreans have been able to open small businesses easily in low-skilled service sectors. Due to the large number of the self-employed and their excessive competition, many of them have experienced marginal profi ts and shrinking market shares. Consequently, the marketplace landscape for the Korean selfemployed has evolved into a "tasan tasa" (many births, many deaths) structure: over 500,000 small businesses annually enter the market, but approximately 400,000 of them fail to survive competition and exit the market. 44 
Concluding Remarks
This study explored why Korea has faced the problem of overworked elderly and underworked youth without realizing its traditional virtue of support for the elderly by young breadwinners. It found that the problem is not unrelated to Korea's way of industrialization but springs from the characteristics of Korea's development path and the resulting contradictions in its labour markets. As evidenced, this study discussed how crony capitalism and growth absolutism have affected the supply and demand structure of labour markets in ways that frustrates young job-seekers while driving the elderly into marginal jobs.
The fi ndings of this study provide a unique critique of the discourse about Confucian capitalism in East Asia. Conventionally, Weberian scholars have rejected the affi nity between capitalist development and Confucian tradition in East Asia only by defi ning this affi nity as being artifi cial or, at best, exaggerated. 45 This study provides an alternative but substantial critique of
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Confucian capitalism by exemplifying the destructive effects of capitalist development on the traditional virtue. Korea's development has benefi ted in the past from the way in which the traditional role of family internalizes welfare costs. However, Korea's unique path of industrialization has not strengthened its Confucian virtue of family-based support for the elderly. Rather, Korea's industrialization has made it increasingly hard for the contemporary family to perform its traditional role by preventing the formation of young breadwinners and compelling the elderly to enter into undesirable workplaces. This study offers three important lessons for East Asian studies. The fi rst is the signifi cance of institutional design in making development and tradition compatible. At this point, it would be worth considering how Taiwan, although regarded as belonging to the family of developing states together with Korea, 46 has been able to realize the Confucian virtue of support for the elderly through its labour markets (see fi gure 1). A possible answer would be that Taiwan, in contrast to Korea, has depended on the dynamics of SMEs for economic growth and that this country has since the mid-1980s been committed to the development of welfare programs for aged citizens. The contrast between Taiwan and Korea suggests that the affi nity between economic development and Confucian virtues is not automatically given in East Asia but rather is dependent on how industrialization is designed and implemented.
The second is the signifi cant role of politics in embedding traditional virtues in modern society. Although a substantial number of Korean families have struggled to provide traditional support for the elderly, this norm has not created a labour market institution that effi ciently develops the youth workforce and supports the retired elderly. As this study has consistently emphasized, the main responsibility for the separation of the family-based virtue from the social realm lies with the state and politics. This strongly implies that without proper political considerations in place, traditional virtue does not serve the public purpose but only remains private. 47 The fi nal lesson is Korea specifi c. This study suggests the contradictory nature of socio-economic policies of Korea's current government. 
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(2008-) has denounced the economic policies of former president Roh as being leftist and returned to the pro-chaebol and growth-fi rst stance by abrogating the ban on chaebol growth through mergers and acquisitions and allowing chaebol to own shares of banks. Recently, however, the government implemented some subsidy schemes, such as internship programs for youth and job creation for the elderly, to avoid criticism for its negligence in this matter. The problem is not simply that these subsidy schemes create only low-paying, temporary jobs. The more serious problem is that Lee's economic policies confl ict with his own social measures for old and young workers. As consistently claimed, the chaebol-based growth only forced many old Koreans to become self-employed or daily workers, regardless of the goal of economic development. This method of economic development cannot mobilize the youth population adequately. That is, Lee's return to chaebol-based economic growth would jeopardize a large segment of workers on the periphery of labour markets.
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